Metaphysics (1): Table, Circle & Whole

Note: This is the first instalment in my comprehensive summary and an opinion piece of this book.

Don’t we all have a time where we think about what nature constitutes and what does it really affect it or doesn’t affect it?

Like what is a chair or the world in general.

Why can we only eat plants and meat but not wood? Why is this this and that is that? What metrics constitute exactly this and that?

While a lot of our doubts get solved by science or losing our natural curiosity, metaphysics attempts to solve these nonsensical questions.

Or rather than solve, gives us a skepticism or first principle thinking of the world from its absolute base that makes things as it is.

Metaphysics is a subsection of philosophy just like the other subsections: ethics, logic and epistemology.

In simple terms, metaphysics is the study of the nature of reality that attempts to clarify and understand it.

Though if you want the literal meaning, metaphysics means after the physics or beyond the physics in Greek.

This does not have any strong relation to physics however. It was simply Aristotle’s book named metaphysics after he wrote on physics and was named as such.

Before we start, it’s important to preface that my essay on this topic is extracted as my personal notes and an opinion piece of the first three chapters of the book, Metaphysics: A Very Short Introduction by Stephen Mumford.

I chose this book because I found it quite good as a refresher and to deepen my knowledge on this subject due to its obvious shortness while also being able to learn and spread my content on this topic to a wider audience.

There will be four essays split based on ascending order of the chapters in the book. This is my first essay.

What is a table?

The example of table is taken as a non-unique item which means it is only used since it is an easy example.

What constitutes a table exactly? Is it something I know because my senses tell what it is or it is out of experience?

Of course our science-filled mind would give a knee-jerk reply of atoms but let’s forget science for a moment.

When one looks at it, they can find its general outlook: brown-colored, hard, four-legged, a desk and so on.

But more than that, what is it really? Is a table nothing but a table of properties rather than a table itself?

Is it simply a permutation and combination of properties that emerged as a table?

Though however, these thought processes seem logical since the properties itself cannot be split away from the table.

There is a fatal flaw in this logic however, some properties do change although some don’t.

I could repaint the color of the table into black according to my taste but nonetheless,anyone who sees it still believes it is a table.

This might mean its color is not a fundamental property that distinguishes whether it is a table or not but then what is the general construct that we define as a table if not for its properties?

This distinction is considered the difference between a qualitative and numerical one.

A change of color is qualitative but numerically nothing has changed.

When a table is moved however, all the properties are moved with it which means they are permanent and one in that moment.

At the very least for this moment, we can be sure that the four-legged and the desk of the table are perfectly together and thus one and the same as the table of properties.

Some consider a substratum view of particulars that underlines all properties on view.

A particular has to be something other than the properties itself but the moment we strip the properties away, we are left with basically nothing.

Let’s discuss the problem with a bundle of properties.

If it were just a bundle of properties then one property change would make it a new bundle so some might think it’s united by degree of continuity as the answer.

A degree of continuity simply means that the physical aspects of the table such as height, weight and its position are the same irrespective of others.

With this theory, we have only one aspect: properties instead of two with substratum and bundle of properties.

But the author points to a few problems with this theory as well.

What about identical twins? If we have the same bundle then we have the same object but two same objects cannot exist.

Of course, one can say no two tables are perfectly the same due to manufacturing defects but should be an inclusive theory, not one that relies on luck.

Two solutions are there: the former is that the spatial location of the objects are different which means they are a unique set of relational properties and thus, not the same.

However, in doing so we reintroduce particulars again which defeats the purpose of the theory.

The latter solution involves relating the spatial positions but the universe has a line of symmetry so it’s automatically invalid.

A final possibility is that there is a distinct particularity even in the same properties. Two different instances of the identical objects.

But as a result, we are forced to admit that particulars are simply a part of nature.

What is a circle?

While it may not be obvious, a circle is very different from other objects.

Circularity has a different nature. When it is divided or not, it is still wholly present as a circle unlike others.

Of course, we won’t divide it as a semi-circle since from then on, it’s not a circle at all. Since a circle can appear wholly elsewhere, its property is different from a table as its property emerges as universals.

According to Plato's heaven however, every object in the physical world that possesses circularity is defective to some degree whereas the perfect circle exists in a heavenly otherworld.

Though connecting two realms comes with its fair share of skepticism and hardship of establishing a logical basis.

If we do indeed admit there is a form of resemblance then we can fall into infinite regress: a loop of resemblances.

While the Plato option is doubtful, there are two other options.

First is anti-realism. The view that describes everything as particulars is nominalism (name-ism). This means that circularity is nothing but the name for a particular set of objects.

But this obviously has its problems. If different objects had circularity and its size as resemblance then they resemble in more than one way which means circularity just resembles objects which it isn’t.

But ultimately resemblance is a relation so we are again appealing to a universal.

Let’s say pair one has resemblance to each other and likewise with pair two but what is exactly the resemblance with pair one and two then? This leads to infinite regress.

Another view of the same kind is particularized qualities which are called tropes but again, the same question arises.

In virtue of what are all these tropes that instead of this for example? This makes us think again that the nature of reality does contain properties.

The other view is Aristotle’s view: immanent realism. This is the realism we all know: circularity exists but only in its instances of circular objects.

Compared to others, this view seems the most believable although it needs some polishing.

Sum of parts

This topic is questioning whether a whole is simply a sum of its parts such as a mobile phone.

But can we truly know if something has parts if we do not see the parts?

Relating to this, a position of an atomist means someone who believes philosophically that things are made from the smallest unit which does mean he believes the sum of parts that he did not find.

An important question to address further: Is the whole greater the sums or simply the same?

Most often we do see a whole literally the sum of parts whether that’s a pile of stones or a herd of sheeps.

However, the properties of the whole are different from the parts. The length of the pile may be a metre but the individual stone is definitely not.

This observation does not seem much of a big deal but with other objects, it possibly is.

A smart phone also has a higher length than its individual parts but there is no individual part that is capable to such a degree which means the whole has a property that the part does not possess.

In such a scenario, it does not seem wrong to conclude that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.

As a result of this, philosophers do distinguish substances of the integrated whole (phone) from aggregates (pile of stones).

There are two broad stances on it.

The former is a reductionist who insists that parts explain why the whole works and believes while we cannot be certain this is the case, science will eventually prove it.

This view is obvious and popular since there are other cases where this holds true.

The latter is emergentism which tells that the whole is more than the sum of parts.

Emergentism is about what there is, not what surprises us. It claims that a whole has novel phenomena that are neither in an individual part or its sum.